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Anthony J. Connolly, Canberra / Australia 
 
The Boundaries of Difference in Law:  
A Critique of Radical Incommensurability 
 
Abstract: Occasionally, in pursuing their adjudicative duties over the course of a legal hearing, judges 
are  called  upon  to  acquire  new  concepts  –  that  is,  concepts  which  they  did  not  possess  at  the 
commencement of the hearing. In performing their judicial role they are required to learn new things 
and, as a result, conceptualise the world in a way which differs from the way they conceived of things 
before the hearing commenced. Some theorists have argued that either as a general matter or as a 
matter specific to judicial practice and the legal context, judges are, with some degree of necessity, 
incapacitated from acquiring certain kinds of concepts. Such concepts include those possessed by the 
members of culturally different minority groups. Drawing on contemporary trends in analytic and 
naturalistic philosophy of mind, this paper explores the extent to which a judge might be incapacitated 
from acquiring new concepts over the course of a legal hearing and identifies those factors which 
condition the success or failure of that process.   
Keywords: judicial understanding, cultural difference, concept acquisition, incommensurability, legal 
epistemology 
 
I. Introduction  
For a while now, various legal theorists have claimed that judges and other officials within 
liberal democratic nation states are unable to understand the thought and practice of culturally 
different minority groups.
1 One way of making sense of assertions such as these is to construe 
them as involving the claim that judges are unable to adequately conceptualise any or certain 
elements of the thought and practice (and associated material artefacts) of the members of 
different  cultures.  They  do  not  and  cannot  possess  an  adequate  concept  of  any  or  some 
culturally different phenomena. As a result, they cannot maintain true beliefs about these 
things - they cannot know them and respond appropriately to them - in any significant sense.  
This is what their lack of understanding consists of.  
Because possessing a concept of a thought or practice involves possessing some set of 
the concepts actually informing that thought or practice, what this claim amounts to is that, in 
their  relations  with  culturally  different  groups,  judges  do  not  possess  and  are  unable  to 
                                                           
1 The Australian legal theorist Penelope Pether, for example, has asserted that, ‘it is a commonplace of accounts 
of indigenous culture … that connection with the land is at its heart, in a way radically incommensurable with 
the non-indigenous…legal consciousness’. Penelope Pether, Principles or Skeletons? Mabo and the Discursive 
Constitution of the Australian Nation, Law Text Culture 4(1), (1998), 115-145 at 118. 2 
adequately acquire some – perhaps, even any - of the concepts which actually inform the 
thought and practice of the members of those groups. They do not possess and cannot acquire, 
what  I  will  term,  ‘culturally  different  concepts’.  Culturally  different  concepts  are  those 
concepts  which,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  judge,  are  possessed  by  the  members  of  a 
culturally different group from, that of the judge.
2 What the theorists in question argue, then, 
is that a situation of conceptual difference exists, analysable in terms of an interpretively 
significant – and again, perhaps even a global - difference in the contents of the respective 
conceptual schemes of the judge and those culturally different minorities which come before 
her.  Further,  these  theorists  argue,  some  degree  of  necessity  obtains  in  relation  to  this 
difference. It cannot be adequately resolved or overcome by the acquisition by judges of the 
concepts they lack - no matter what circumstances they find themselves in, qua judges. We 
might conceive of this irresolvable difference between the conceptual schemes of the agents 
in question in terms of an untranslatability or incommensurability between those schemes.
3 
On  this  construal,  the  abovementioned  theorists  maintain  that  a  significant  degree  of 
conceptual incommensurability  obtains  in  the  legal  sphere  as  far  as  culturally  different 
minorities  are  concerned,  comprising  both  a  difference  in  conceptual  schemes  and  a 
cognitive-cum-interpretive incapacity as far as overcoming that difference is concerned.  
This paper’s aim is to explore the capacity of the modern liberal legal system, through its 
judicial agents, to understand or conceptualise the thought and practice of culturally different 
people. It will proceed by means of a philosophically and legally informed engagement with 
the cultural incommensurabilist viewpoint. 
 
II. The radical cultural incommensurability thesis 
With  these  introductory  comments  in  hand,  I  want  to  explore  now  the  limits  of  judicial 
interpretive activity by pursuing a systematic critique of what I will term the radical cultural 
incommensurability thesis. The radical cultural incommensurability thesis maintains that as a 
matter of theoretical necessity no judge possesses or is able to acquire any culturally different 
concept. This is to say that the possession or acquisition by a judge of a culturally different 
concept is theoretically impossible.
4 
                                                           
2 I will also be using the term alien concepts to refer to those concepts which are not, at a given point in time, 
possessed by judges.   
3 Dorit Bar-on defines cultural incommensurabilism as the view that ‘different cultures view the world through 
conceptual schemes that cannot be reconciled.’ Conceptual Relativism and Translation, in Language, Mind and 
Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy, F. S. G. Preyer, A. Ulfig (Eds.), (1994) 145-170, 145. 
4 In exploring the plausibility of the radical cultural incommensurability thesis, I adopt a physicalist-functionalist 
account of intentionality, action and a theory-theory account of interpretation, as my possibility-defining theory 3 
The incommensurability invoked by the thesis is radical by virtue of being theoretically 
necessary, general, and global. It is necessary in that it is alleged to obtain in all theoretically 
possible  worlds  and,  therefore,  under  all  theoretically  possible  epistemic  conditions.  No 
circumstances are possible – internal or external to the judge - under which a judge possesses 
or acquires a culturally different concept. The thesis is general in that it applies to all judges 
and all culturally different agents and associated groups. And it is global in that it obtains for 
all culturally different concepts, together with the propositions, intentional states, and actions 
informed by those concepts. The thesis alleges that the scheme of concepts maintained by 
judges and the scheme maintained by culturally different agents have no conceptual content in 
common right down to the basic conceptual categories which might be argued to structure the 
very experience of the world maintained by these agents and, further, that nothing can be 
done by a judge to enable those schemes to have any content in common, no matter what 
relevant circumstances that judge might find herself in.
 5 
Radical cultural incommensurability may be analysed as having two interrelated aspects 
– that of radical conceptual difference and that of a radical incapacity in relation to concept 
acquisition.
6 Within the terms of the thesis in question, the latter is entailed by the former. My 
strategy in this paper will be to explore the plausibility of each of the two elements of the 
thesis – radical conceptual difference and radical concept-acquisitive incapacity – in turn.
7  
 
III. The limits of conceptual difference 
1. Argument against the necessity of global and general conceptual difference 
Because it is theoretically possible on the physicalist-functionalist account of things adopted 
here for any or all judges and any or all culturally different agents to possess neuro-physical 
states fulfilling identical intentional-functional roles within broader neuro-physical systems - 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of things. This is to say that, for the purposes of this paper, I define theoretical possibility and necessity with 
reference to the set of possible worlds in which that account of things is true. 
5 It follows from this notion of the respective agents inhabiting radically different worlds that not only are judges 
not in possession of and unable to acquire culturally different concepts but culturally different agents are not in 
possession of and are unable to acquire any of the concepts possessed by the judge and other members of her 
culture. This element of the radical cultural incommensurability thesis raises important questions about the very 
participation of culturally different agents in the legal process. As a dominant societal institution thoroughly 
informed by dominant societal concepts possessed by the judge, if the legal process is entirely conceptually 
opaque to culturally different agents one might reasonably ask what it would be that would possibly motivate 
those agents to engage with that process in the manner that they do. 
6 Bar-on (note 3), 157. The dialectic at work in the radical cultural incommensurability thesis reflects the two 
aspects of concept acquisition to be discussed below – the degree of conceptual difference obtaining at the 
commencement of the interpretive encounter and the epistemic conditions obtaining over the course of that 
encounter. 
7 I will only outline in this short paper the arguments in question. A more detailed elaboration may be found in 
Chapter 6 of my recent book Cultural Difference on Trial: The Nature and Limits of Judicial Understanding, 
2010.  4 
and how could it not be? - it is theoretically possible for such agents to possess identical (that 
is, shared) intentional states and concepts. There is nothing in the physicalist-functionalist 
picture of things which would rule out a neuro-physical state possessed by a judge and one 
possessed by a culturally different agent both being such as to be typically caused by the same 
set of environmental and intentional inputs and typically causing of the same set of intentional 
and behavioural outputs, given some set of background intentional states - as a possibility, at 
least. No aspect of that picture of things is inconsistent with such a situation obtaining. And if 
it is theoretically possible for such agents to possess such neuro-physical states in common, 
then it is not theoretically necessary that such agents do not possess such states, as well as the 
concepts those states realise, in common.  
 
2. Argument against the possibility of global and general conceptual difference 
a) Shared interpretive agency concepts 
By  virtue  of  being  able  to  interpret  the  behaviour  of  themselves  and  other  agents,  all 
interpretive  agents  possess  some  interpretively  adequate  part  of  a  tripartite  psychology 
(comprising theories of agency, mind and specific agents) which is necessarily informed in 
part by a core set of agency concepts – concepts such as agent, intentional state, belief, desire, 
environmental input, behavioural output, causation and the like. The possession of this set of 
concepts by interpretive agents is supported by scientifically sound evidence that some part of 
the set are innate and some part is the result of a significantly shared process of socialisation 
(through  appropriately  interacting  with  other  agents  from  birth)  into  effective  interpretive 
agency.
8 Whatever the explanation, it follows that a set of agency concepts exists which is 
possessed  to  some  degree  or  other  by  all  interpretive  agents  no  matter  what  their 
environmental-intentional trajectories through life, no matter what their race or culture. 
We can go further and argue that the possession by all interpretive agents – all judges and 
culturally  different  agents  -  of  this  shared  set  of  agency  concepts  is  so  central  to  the 
physicalist-functionalist theory of agency, intentionality and interpretation elaborated here as 
to constitute a possibility-defining component of that theory. If we accept such argument (and 
I would urge that we should) then it follows that it is not theoretically possible for any judge 
and any culturally different agent (let alone all judges and all such agents) qua interpretive 
agents  to  be  globally  conceptually  different,  to  hold  no  concepts  in  common.  On  the 
physicalist-functionalist account of things relied upon here, it is theoretically necessary that 
all judges and all culturally different agents possess some interpretively adequate set of this 
                                                           
8 See for example, Susan Carey, The Origin of Concepts, 2011. 5 
shared set of agency concepts, as well as some set of the sub-conceptual content of those 
concepts (concepts are holistic) in common.
9 Judges and other agents can differ in regard to a 
whole range of other concepts possessed by them – environmental, bodily, intentional, and so 
on – but not in regard to this set.  
Therefore, not only is the radical conceptual difference thesis – the thesis that global 
general conceptual difference is necessary - not plausible within our theoretical schema, but 
the thesis that global general conceptual difference is possible is not plausible either. 
 
b) Beyond shared interpretive agency concepts – shared innate concepts 
On  the  account  of  concept  acquisition  most  compatible  with  physicalist-functionalism,  a 
concept is acquired by an agent only on the condition that some set of the sub-conceptual 
content of that concept is possessed by that agent. This set of sub-conceptual content serves as 
part of the background set of intentional states associated with an agent being caused to hold 
an  intentional  state  containing  the  (primary)  concept  by  some  or  other  environmental  or 
intentional input. If this is the case, then it must also be the case that human infants acquire 
concepts  in  response  to  their  initial  sensory  experiences  of  the  world  (their  initial 
environmental inputs, whether in the womb or after birth) by means of some set of pre-
experiential  concepts  –  that  is,  by  means  of  an  innate  concept-acquisitive  conceptual 
repertoire. This is to say that human infants innately - and therefore universally - possess 
some or other set of low-level or core or categorial (perception- and conception-structuring) 
concepts by which they get the concept acquisition process off and running, by which they 
build up a conceptual scheme in the face of their experience of the world and their developing 
reasoning abilities.  
On the account of concept acquisition given here there is no other way for human infants 
to acquire concepts of the environmental phenomena they encounter in the world following 
birth than by possessing at birth some or other (by definition, innate) categorial conceptual 
base.
10 Empirical research in developmental psychology on how infants build up a conceptual 
scheme and worldview supports the existence of such innate categorial concepts.
11 Further, 
                                                           
9 Of course, it is possible that interpretive agents possess a range of concepts in addition to these shared agency 
concepts which are not shared. The set of shared agency concepts is not sufficient in itself to engender a 
practically adequate understanding of a culturally different action or a practically adequate interpretation of a 
testimonial action about a culturally different action. Other non-necessarily-shared concepts are also required. 
10 Or the innate potential (a genetic, neurophysiological predisposition, perhaps) to develop such a concept-
acquisitive conceptual base automatically over a period following birth. 
11 See for example, Carey (note 8), Elizabeth Spelke, The Origins of Physical Knowledge, in Thought Without 
Language, ed. L. Weiskrantz, 1988, and Anna Shusterman and Elizabeth Spelke, Language and the development 
of spatial reasoning, in eds. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, and Stephen Stich, The innate mind: Structure 
and contents, 2005, 89-106. 6 
given  the  nature  of  these  innate  concepts  as  fundamental  to  all  subsequently  acquired 
concepts, there is theoretically sound reason to think that their possession by human agents 
continues after infancy and that they are relied upon on an ongoing basis over the course of an 
agent’s life to acquire further concepts in the development of her conceptual scheme. Again, 
findings in the psychological literature seem to support this.
12 
 
c) Beyond shared innate concepts 
It is worth noting that there would be no need to stop here at the set of categorial concepts if 
there  were  other  concepts  –  non-categorial  and  non-agency  concepts  –  the  universal 
possession of which was both solidly empirically evidenced and fundamentally embedded 
within  the  physicalist-functionalist  schema.  For  example,  there  is  an  interesting  body  of 
evidence  and  argument  in  linguistics  and  anthropology  pointing  to  the  possession  by  all 
human agents of certain non-categorial and non-agency concepts as a nomological matter.
13 
Again, were such findings to be sufficiently empirically established and justified as logically 
central and possibility-defining within the physicalist-functionalist schema these concepts too 
might find a place in the necessarily shared set of concepts provided for by that schema and 
might further circumscribe the limits of possible conceptual difference within that schema. 
 
3. The limits of conceptual difference 
There is, then, a limit on the degree of conceptual difference which may obtain between any 
judge and any culturally different agent who might come before her over the course of a 
hearing. This limit arises out of the terms of the physicalist-functionalist account of agency, 
intentionality and interpretation relied upon here, including the findings of our best empirical 
inquiries into these things. For the physicalist-functionalist, a culturally different agent can be 
as conceptually different from a judge as is consistent with that agent being an agent (or more 
specifically, an interpretive agent) according to the possibility-defining terms of that account. 
This is to say that any such agent can be as different from a judge as is consistent with cogent 
                                                           
12 See, Astington, Harris and Olsen, Developing Theories of Mind, 1988 p.12 in relation to innate agency 
concepts. Henry Wellman, Culture, Variation, and Levels of Analysis in Folk Psychologies: Comment on 
Lillard, Psychological Bulletin 123(1), (1998), 33-36 acknowledges the possibility of complex adult agency 
concepts differing significantly from the simple innate concepts of young children, though not at their sub-
conceptual core. On the other hand, Gopnik’s Neurathian approach to the possession and development of a 
theory of agency in an interpretive agent appears to be consistent with the loss of innate agency concepts over 
time in response to environmental experience and socialisation. Alison Gopnik, Theories and modules: creation 
myths, developmental realities, and Neurath's boat, in (eds.) Peter Carruthers and P. K. Smith, Theories of 
Theories of Mind, 1996, 169-183. 
13 See, for example, the work of Eleanor Rosch and Anna Wierzbicka. Eleanor Rosch, Linguistic Relativity, in 
ed. A. Silverstein, Human Communication: Theoretical Explorations, 1974. Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics, 
Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations, 1992. 7 
relevant empirical evidence and as is consistent with the terms of the physicalist-functionalist 
system  of  knowledge  at  large,  including  the  metaphysical  doctrine  of  physicalism  itself. 
Within  the  physicalist-functionalist  framework,  the  parameters  of  possible  conceptual 
difference between any judge and any culturally different agent range from there being no 
conceptual difference at all
14 to there being a degree of conceptual difference consistent with 
the existence of whatever necessarily shared concepts physi calist-functionalists can soundly 
argue for. This latter degree constitutes the upper limit of possible conceptual difference for 
any such agents. No more difference than this is theoretically possible for any such agents. 
Despite being less than global, t he maximal theoretically possible degree of conceptual 
difference between a judge and culturally different agent may,  whilst it lasts, be enough to 
undermine many, if not all, of the cognitive and interpretive endeavours of any judge under 
any circumstances in relation to such agent. It may be enough to undermine the vast majority 
of a judge’s cognitive and interpretive endeavours over the course of the legal hearing.
15  
 
IV. The Limits of Concept Acquisition 
According to the physicalist-functionalist account of things, an intentional state containing a 
concept is typically caused by one of a set of environmental or intentional inputs but only 
provided that an associated set of background intentional states is in place. Where a culturally 
different concept is not possessed by a judge at the commencement of a hearing, it may be 
acquired  over  the  course  of  a  hearing  if  the  judge  engages  in  an  appropriate  cognitive 
response to appropriate environmental inputs or intentional inputs – which in the context of a 
legal  proceeding  means  where  the  judge  appropriately  engages  with  or  in  appropriate 
evidence and reasoning. Again, this is possible only if sufficient sub-concepts of that concept 
are already possessed by the judge. And such sub-concepts may be acquired, if needed, in the 
same  manner,  provided  that  the  judge  possesses  sufficient  sub-concepts  of  those  sub-
concepts.  A  judge  may  acquire  whatever  sub-conceptual  content  of  a  culturally  different 
concept  is  necessary for possession  of that concept  by coming into appropriate cognitive 
contact with evidence or engaging in reasoning appropriate to acquiring that sub-conceptual 
content but always on the basis of possessing relevant, lower-order, sub-conceptual content. 
                                                           
14 Though it is implausible to think that two agents could be conceptually identical, even within the same 
conceptual community, nonetheless it is not impossible on a physicalist-functionalist approach.   
15 It is worth keeping in mind here that whilst the existence of necessarily shared agency, categorial or other 
innate concepts admits of the possibility of substantial conceptual difference it does not necessitate substantial 
conceptual difference. Within the parameters established above, the extent of the conceptual difference which 
obtains between a judge and culturally different agent depends upon the environmental and intentional 
trajectories those agents take over the course of their lives. And the nature of those trajectories is a contingent 
matter depending upon the nature of the environmental and intentional inputs – the evidence and reasoning - 
those agents are causally subject to over the course of their lives. 8 
In this way a judge may build up to possession of a culturally different concept, sub-concept 
by sub-concept over a period of time. She may acquire a culturally different concept by a 
multi-staged  process  of  sub-concept  acquisition  in  response  to  appropriate  evidence  and 
reasoning.  
Thus, there are two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for acquiring 
a culturally different concept – the possession of appropriate and adequate sub-conceptual 
content (or - from the perspective of intentional states - possession-relevant beliefs), on the 
one  hand  and  appropriate  cognitive  engagement  with  appropriate  evidence  or  appropriate 
reasoning in relation to one’s present beliefs, on the other. We can redescribe these conditions 
in terms of the obtaining of an acquisition-enabling degree of conceptual difference and an 
acquisition-enabling set of epistemic conditions.
16 If either or both of the conditions necessary 
for the acquisition by a given judge of a given culturally different concept fail, then that 
concept cannot be acquired by that judge. 
If  some  or  all  judges  are  not  properly  engaged  with  appropriate  evidence  or  in 
appropriate reasoning – that is, if conducive epistemic conditions do not obtain - then those 
judges will not be able to acquire an associated concept no matter how much of that concept’s 
sub-conceptual content they possess. Likewise, if some or all judges do not possess sufficient 
of a concept’s sub-conceptual content, they will not (whilst that lack continues) be able to 
acquire that concept no matter what evidence or reasoning they engage with or in. Judicial 
concept-acquisitive success depends upon the degree of conceptual difference which obtains 
between the judge and the culturally different concept in question - how much of the sub-
conceptual content of that concept she possesses at the commencement of the hearing and 
how much of that content she has to acquire over the course of the hearing – as well as upon 
the nature of the epistemic conditions which obtain in relation to the judge and the concept 
over the course of the hearing.  
Those who advocate the radical concept-acquisitive incapacity thesis are committed to 
arguing that either or both of these conditions necessarily do not obtain for any judge in 
regard  to  any  and  all  culturally  different  concepts.  They  must,  for  example,  argue  that 
necessarily  no  judge  possesses  a  set  of  sub-conceptual  content  which  would  enable  the 
acquisition of any culturally different concept under any possible epistemic circumstances - 
that as a matter of theoretical necessity neither the necessarily nor the possibly shared set of 
concepts  and  sub-concepts  mentioned  in  the  previous  section  contains  an  acquisitively 
adequate set of the sub-conceptual content of any non-shared culturally different concept. 
                                                           
16 The epistemic conditions informing a situation of concept acquisition do not include the degree of conceptual 
difference which obtains in that situation.  9 
They must hold that a degree and kind of conceptual difference necessarily obtains which - 
even  if  they  accept  the  critique  of  global  difference  mounted  in  the  previous  section  -  
nonetheless disables judges from acquiring any culturally different concept. Alternatively, or 
additionally,  they  must  argue  that  necessarily  no  judge  comes  into  appropriate  cognitive 
engagement with evidence or engage in appropriate reasoning causal of the acquisition of any 
culturally different concept. This is to say that necessarily, epistemic conditions conducive to 
the acquiring of any culturally different concept by any judge do not obtain.  
I argue that it is not the case that either or both of these conditions necessarily do not 
obtain for any judge and any culturally different concept. On the contrary, the obtaining of 
both of these conditions, for all judges and all culturally different concepts, is theoretically 
possible.
17 
 
1. The possibility of an adequate conceptual base 
If it turns out that the necessarily or possibly shared set of concepts mentioned in the previous 
section either necessarily or possibly includes sub-concepts sufficient for the acquisition of 
some  or  other  non-shared  culturally  different  concept,  then  the  incommensurabilist 
proposition that necessarily any such shared set does not include such sub-concepts will be 
rendered implausible. Likewise, if it turns out that the necessarily or possibly shared set of 
concepts  mentioned  in  the  previous  section  either  necessarily  or  possibly  includes  sub-
concepts sufficient for the acquisition of all non-shared culturally different concepts, then 
again the incommensurabilist proposition that necessarily any such set does not include such 
sub-concepts will fail.
18 Whether a necessarily or possibly shared set of concepts can enable 
the acquisition of any or all non -shared culturally different concepts in conjunction with 
appropriate evidence or reasoning is an empirical and interpretive matter to do with the 
semantic relations which exist between that shared set and the non-shared concept or concepts 
in question. 
What can we say about such concepts and their capacity to enable the judicial acquisition 
of any or all non-shared culturally different concepts, should conducive epistemic conditions 
obtain? Let me pursue an argument here in relation to the innate concept -acquiring or 
categorial  concepts  which  I  argued  all  agents  necessarily  possess  on  the  physicalist -
                                                           
17 Though not theoretically necessary, of course.  
18 And if we can establish the theoretical possibility of the ‘conducive epistemic conditions’ condition of judicial 
concept-acquisition obtaining in relation to any culturally different concept, the theoretical possibility that any 
judge might acquire any culturally different concept will be confirmed. 10 
functionalist schema.
19 Some set of those categorial concepts pro vided culturally different 
agents with a sub-conceptual means to post-natally acquire some set of simple non -innate 
culturally different concepts in response to those agents’ post-natal epistemic conditions. If 
we accept the theoretical possibility argued for earlier that those same categorial concepts are 
possessed  by  all  judges  and  remain  functional  in  those  judges  in  the  acquisition  of  new 
concepts
20, then we have grounds for arguing that judges possess as a theoretical possibility a 
sub-conceptual base for the acquisition of some simple set of non-shared culturally different 
concepts. Further, if we accept (as I argue we should) the possibility that epistemic conditions 
relevantly  analogous  –  though  not  necessarily  identical  –  to  the  post-natal  epistemic 
conditions which obtained for those culturally different agents might obtain for any and all 
judges over the course of a legal hearing, then we are logically committed to the possibility 
that  all  judges  may  acquire  any  and  all  of  those  simple  post-natally  acquired  culturally 
different concepts, even at the limits of possible conceptual difference, rebutting the revised 
radical concept-acquisitive incapacity thesis in relation to its denial of the judicial acquisition 
of, at least, some or other set of culturally different concepts. 
We need not stop here, though. Given that these simple non-innate culturally different 
concepts together with the innate categorial concepts provided culturally different agents with 
a sub-conceptual base for the acquisition of all the non-shared concepts possessed by them, 
their possible possession by all judges together with the possible judicial possession of the set 
of innate categorial concepts possessed by culturally different agents opens up the possibility 
of all judges possessing a sub-conceptual base for the acquisition of any and all culturally 
different concepts – provided, of course, that it is possible that those judges be subject to 
acquisitively conducive epistemic conditions analogous to those that enabled the culturally 
different agents to acquire those concepts in the first place. Having acquired a set of simple 
non-shared culturally different concepts on the basis of a shared set of categorial concepts, it 
is possible that any judge might then go on to build up and acquire more complex non-shared 
culturally different concepts in response to appropriate evidence and reasoning, in a manner 
analogous to the way the culturally different agents did.
21 Indeed, if her environmental and 
intentional situation were conducive enough the judge might proceed to acquire  any and all 
elements  of  the  culturally  different  conceptual  scheme  by  pursuing  an  environmental-
                                                           
19 I refer the reader to Connolly (note 7) for discussion of the other kinds of concepts referred to earlier, which I 
will pass over here.  
20 As I argued above, there is no sound reason to think that the concept-acquisitive functionality of innate 
categorial concepts in adults is theoretically impossible. Indeed, there is reason to believe that their functionality 
in adults follows from their possession as a theoretical necessity.  
21 There is no reason to think that a particular concept-acquisitive trajectory is off limits to a judge, as I shall 
argue below.  11 
intentional trajectory into that scheme similar to or equivalent to that taken by a culturally 
different agent.
22 
If, again, we accept the possibility (soon to be argued for) that acquisitively conducive 
epistemic conditions might obtain for any and all judges over the course of a legal hearing in 
relation to any or all culturally different concepts, then we are logically committed to the 
possibility that given their possible possession of the innate categorial concepts possessed by 
culturally different agents, all judges might acquire any or all culturally different concepts  – 
including  a  set  of  practically  adequate  culturally  different  concepts  as  far  as  her  judicial 
purposes  were  concerned.  This  possibility  rebuts  the  revised  radical  concept-acquisitive 
incapacity thesis in relation to its denial of the judicial acquisition of any or all culturally 
different concepts. The judicial acquisition of any part or the whole of the culturally different 
conceptual scheme remains a possibility here, grounded ultimately in the possible possession 
of a shared set of innate concept-acquiring concepts, as well as the possibility of conducive 
epistemic  conditions  obtaining  over  the  course  of  the  hearing.  Of  course,  the  possibility 
argued for here is a contingent one.
23 
Were we to take the various propositions elaborated here in relation to the possession and 
functionality  of  a  shared  set  of  innate  categorial  concepts  as  not  merely  contingent 
possibilities  but  as  central  and  possibility -defining  tenets  of  the physicalist -functionalist 
theoretical framework (and one could mount an argument that we should take them as such)
24, 
then not only would it be possible for a judge to acquire any and all culturally different 
concepts under conducive epistemic conditions but it would be necessary that she does, under 
such conditions. Such a theoretical manoeuvre on our part would, in conjunction with other 
theoretical  propositions,  not  merely  enable  us  to  rebut  the  radical  concept-acquisitive 
incapacity  thesis  (as  the  previous  possibility-based  argument  did),  but  it  would  also 
circumscribe  the  limits  of  possible  judicial  concept-acquisitive  incapacity.  Under  the 
possibility based argument just outlined, it is theoretically possible that either or both of the 
necessary conditions for judicial concept acquisition fail to obtain.  
                                                           
22 It is worth noting here that this capacity to acquire non-shared culturally different concepts would exist even if 
it turns out that concepts are not initially acquired by infants by means of innate concepts but by some other 
innate and cross-culturally shared mechanism. 
23 Of course, as a corollary of this possibility it is also possible that all judges and all culturally different agents 
do not possess the same set of innate categorial concepts and that conducive epistemic conditions for acquiring 
non-necessarily-shared culturally different concepts do not obtain for any judge in relation to any indigenous 
concept (the union of these two propositions). That is, it is contingently possible for the physicalist functionalist 
that no judge can acquire any culturally different concept under any possible epistemic conditions. 
24 Again, relevant arguments here would have to do with the degree to which the proposition in question is 
supported by sound empirical evidence as well as with the degree to which is implicated in the body of other 
propositions constituting the physicalist-functionalist scheme of knowledge. 12 
And so it is possible on that less circumscribing approach that, even where conducive 
epistemic conditions obtain a judge may not acquire a culturally different concept by virtue of 
the possibility of her not possessing an acquisitively adequate sub-conceptual base. However, 
where  it  is  necessarily  the  case  that  the  judge  possesses  an  acquisitively  adequate  sub-
conceptual  base  –  as  follows  from  rendering  the  judicial  possession  of  a  functional, 
universally shared categorial set a theoretical necessity – then necessarily where conducive 
epistemic conditions obtain a judge acquires any and all culturally different concepts.  
 
2. The possibility of conducive epistemic conditions 
In order to acquire a concept an agent must either come into appropriate sensory and cognitive 
contact with a set of environmental phenomena causal of that concept or must engage in a 
process  of  reasoning  which  is  causal  of  the  acquisition  of  that  concept,  all  against  the 
background of a set of conceptually relevant intentional states or, as I have also been terming 
it, a set of acquisition-adequate sub-conceptual content. Throughout this paper, I have been 
conceiving  of  the  various  environmental,  sensory,  cognitive,  behavioural  and  other 
phenomena implicated in the process of judicial concept acquisition, other than the judge’s 
possession of the background set of intentional states or sub-conceptual base in terms of the 
epistemic conditions  surrounding the judge in  relation  to  the acquisition of the culturally 
different concept in question.  
These epistemic conditions may be categorised in terms of the internal capacities of the 
judge and the external circumstances she is subject to. The former category includes, for 
example,  those  conditions  to  do  with  the  quality  of  the  judge’s  sensory,  cognitive  and 
reasoning apparatus (including her capacity to see and hear properly, as well as her capacity 
to  properly  conceptualise  sensory  data);  the  quality  of  the  judge’s  bodily  motor  skills 
(including her capacity to seek out and manipulate conceptually relevant evidence, as well as 
move her body into a state or position conducive to cognitively appropriating that evidence); 
the  quality  of  the  judge’s  reasoning  skills  (including,  most  importantly,  her  capacity  to 
interpretively  reason  within  the  parameters  of  the  various  theories  of  agency  and  mind 
mentioned in the previous section); and the quality of the judge’s motivation to sensorily and 
cognitively  engage  with  evidence  and  to  reason  appropriately  (including  the  nature  and 
strength of her desires to do so). The latter category includes those conditions to do with the 
nature of the environmental phenomena which causally interact with the judge (including the 
identity and amount of the evidence presented to her, as well as the lighting and auditory 
conditions surrounding her engagement with that evidence);  the nature and quality of any 13 
sensory,  cognitive  or  reasoning  aids  available  to  the  judge  and  other  relevant  agents 
(including the availability of microphones, video conferencing facilities, and computers); and 
the time available to her for concept acquisition.  
It  is  clear  that  in  acquiring  the  various  culturally  different  concepts  they  possess, 
culturally  different  agents  were subject  to one  or other of the range of sets  of epistemic 
conditions which are conducive to the acquisition of those concepts. At some point in time, 
those agents possessed some concept-acquiring set of internal capacities and were subject to 
some  concept-acquiring  set  of  external  circumstances.  They  possessed  adequate  sensory 
apparatus and came into appropriate sensory contact with concept-causing evidence under 
suitable  conditions  of  light  and  sound,  they  possessed  suitable  cognitive  and  reasoning 
faculties and properly conceptualised that evidence and reasoned about it, they possessed 
motor skills which enabled them to behaviourally manipulate that evidence for their concept-
acquisitive ends, and they had at their disposal sufficient time to do all of these things and 
acquire the concepts in question. Further, given that culturally different concepts continue to 
be acquired by culturally different agents, epistemic conditions conducive to the acquisition 
of each and every culturally different concept continue to obtain. By virtue of the fact that 
culturally different agents have acquired and continue to acquire culturally different concepts, 
it follows that the obtaining of epistemic conditions conducive to the acquisition of every 
culturally different concept is theoretically possible.
25  
Additionally,  given  that  within  the  physicalist -functionalist  schema  there  is  no  ‘in 
principle’ difference between the internal capacities and external circumstances a member of 
a dominant culture (including a judge) may possess or be subject to and those a member of a 
culturally  different  minority  may  possess  or  be  subject  to,  the  possibility  of  conducive 
epistemic conditions obtaining for culturally different agents entails the possibility of their 
obtaining for dominant societal agents, including judges. Because no impossibility attaches 
within physicalist-functionalism to the obtaining of conducive internal capacities and external 
circumstances for judges, it follows that it is theoretically possible within that schema that 
epistemic conditions conducive to the acquisition of any and all culturally different concepts 
obtain for any and all judges. Nothing within the physicalist-functionalist schema necessitates 
the isolation of any dominant societal agent, including any judge, from the influence of any of 
the  epistemic  conditions  causal  of  a  culturally  different  concept,  given  possession  of  an 
appropriate sub-conceptual base.  
                                                           
25 No reasonable cultural incommensurabilist would deny this, I think.  14 
Whether or not it is theoretically possible for conducive epistemic conditions to obtain 
over the course of a legal proceeding (as distinct from obtaining generally), depends upon 
whether there are any features specific to a legal proceeding which theoretically necessitate 
the non-obtaining of such conditions as far as the presiding judge is concerned. Quite simply, 
given  a  naturalistic  account  of  such  proceedings  as  a  complex  and  interrelated  series  of 
actions performed by relevant agents, including the judge and culturally different participants, 
within the context  of some or other external  environment,  there are not.
26 There is good 
reason, then, for physicalist-functionalists to maintain that the obtaining of the second of the 
aforementioned conditions of culturally different concept acquisition  –  that  the  judge  be 
subject to conducive epistemic conditions – is possible for any or all judges in relation to any 
or  all  culturally  different  concepts.  A  radical  incommensurabilist  argument  that  such 
condition is not possible – that a failure of conducive conditions is necessary - is implausible. 
 
V. The limits of judicial concept acquisition 
The acquisition of a culturally different concept by a judge is possible only if both of the two 
individually  necessary  and  jointly  sufficient  conditions  for  that  acquisition  are  possible  – 
namely, that the judge possesses an acquisition-adequate set of sub-conceptual content for 
that concept  and that the epistemic conditions  under which the judge thinks and acts  are 
conducive to the acquisition of that concept. Judicial concept acquisition is possible if the 
degree  of  conceptual  difference  which  exists  between  the  judge  and  culturally  different 
concept or culturally different agent in question is not so great as to render acquisition under 
any epistemic conditions impossible and if epistemic conditions enabling acquisition at that 
degree of conceptual difference are possible. I have endeavoured to show that, assuming the 
truth of the physicalist-functionalist account of things offered in this paper, it is theoretically 
possible for both of these conditions to concurrently obtain for all judges and all culturally 
different concepts - even under conditions of maximal possible conceptual difference - over 
the course of a legal hearing.  
Thus, it is theoretically possible for any judge to acquire any culturally different concept 
at any possible degree of conceptual difference, provided that over the course of the hearing 
she is subject to conditions which enable her to cognitively appropriate evidence and reason 
in a manner causal of the acquisition of that concept. It is not the case that all judges are 
necessarily incapacitated from acquiring any culturally different concept under any epistemic 
                                                           
26 I pursue a more detailed argument against such an account of the nature of legal proceedings in Connolly 
2010. 15 
conditions, including those obtaining at hearing. The radical concept-acquisitive incapacity 
thesis is not plausible from the physicalist-functionalist point of view.
27  
 
VI. Conclusion  
Because  both  the  radical  conceptual  difference  thesis  and  the  radical  concept-acquisitive 
incapacity theses are not plausible, neither is the radical cultural incommensurability thesis 
which, as  we saw, is  comprised of these. As far as  the limits  of incommensurability are 
concerned in relation to judges and culturally different agents and their concepts, it remains 
theoretically possible that the non-necessarily-shared part of the conceptual schemes of any 
judge and any culturally different agent be incommensurable under any theoretically possible 
epistemic conditions. As a contingent possibility though, this proposition entails that it is also 
theoretically possible that the conceptual schemes of any judge and any culturally different 
agent be commensurable under certain possible (acquisition conducive) epistemic conditions. 
The  interpretation  of  culturally  different  agents  by  judges  and  the  judicial  acquisition  of 
concepts testified about by those agents – even to a practically adequate degree as far as the 
judge’s determinative purposes are concerned - is a theoretical possibility for a physicalist-
functionalist such as myself, even if the maximal possible degree of conceptual difference 
obtains  between  the  judge  and  any  such  agents  at  the  commencement of  the  interpretive 
encounter between them. Consequently, the judicial understanding of any and all culturally 
different actions and the proper determination of legal matters implicating cultural difference 
is possible on the physicalist functionalist approach. There is no need to be pessimistic about 
the  recognitional  and  protective  potential  of  the  legal  system  –  at  least,  on  metaphysical 
grounds. 
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27 Indeed, if we step back from the detail of the preceding argument about the limits of judicial concept-
acquisitive incapacity and think about what culturally different concepts are within the physicalist-functionalist 
scheme of things, both the consistency of that argument with the basic tenets of physicalist-functionalism and the 
implausibility of the radical cultural incommensurability thesis becomes clear. For a start, the very idea that there 
could exist in the world a higher-order phenomenon (namely, a culturally different concept or intentional state), 
the identity – which is to say, the functional role or content - of which is necessarily unknowable to every actual 
and possible inquirer who is not a member of a specific cultural group, including those operating within our best 
sciences, is fundamentally inconsistent with the monistic ontological and epistemological ethos of the physicalist 
project. 